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Draft: Symposium on Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, University 
of Iowa, 28 March 1984. Not for quotation or paraphrase. 
 
 
Rhetoric and Liberation 
 
Thomas S. Kuhn 
 
 
I come before you as Cassandra. There is much in this 
morning's papers with which I agree and even more which I 
find of interest. But there is also a common theme which 
deeply alarms me. In different ways and to different 
degrees, all three papers celebrate a new liberation, 
intellectual and political, which is to follow on the proper 
appreciation of rhetoric's place in human life. I believe that 
that impulse to celebration rests on a profound 
misconception of the human condition, a misconception 
here manifest in an insufficient respect for the intrinsic 
authority of language. Reading these papers I have 
repeatedly been reminded of the occasions during the 
sixties when my more radical students said to me: Thank 
you, Professor Kuhn, for telling us about paradigms; now 
that we know what they are, we can get on without them. 
For all my sympathy with the reforms those students 
sought, I knew (and thought I had taught them) that in that 
direction there was, in principle, no help to be had. 
In twenty minutes I shall not persuade you of my 
position, but I can perhaps suggest to you what it is. For the 
purpose I am fortunate to be able to start from Professor 
Rorty’s paper. With many of its most important theses my 










   
entire, a fact that should enable me to locate with special 
precision the points where our views diverge. Most of my 
time will be directed to his contribution. Only in closing 
shall I note how the other two papers contribute to the 
concerns I have been discussing. 
Let me start with agreements. Rorty and I both insist 
"that there is nothing to be said about either truth or 
rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar 
procedures of justification which a given society --  ours -- 
uses in one or another area of inquiry" (5). There is, we 
again concur, “no room for a kind of justification which is 
not merely social but natural, springing from human 
nature itself, and made possible by a link between that 
part of nature and the rest" (3). Neither of us believes that 
there is an Archimedean standing point outside of the 
tribe and its history. And both of us see in discourse the 
primary motor for change of belief. The working title of 
my own current project is Scientific Knowledge as 
Historical Product, and it opens by suggesting that those 
of us who, a quarter-century ago, called upon 
philosophers of science to pay attention to its history 
missed a point. For most of us history was simply a source 
of data about scientific practice, data which we thought 
might equally well have been drawn from one or another 
non-historical source. We did not, that is, sufficiently 
recognize the intrinsically historical nature of the new 
view we were trying to shape. And, finally, much of the 
book in which I hope to develop these points will be 
concerned with scientific language and its changes. The 
extent of that agreement is sufficient to place Rorty and 
me in a small minority, and I greatly value the continuing 
 





discourse which that common membership has fostered. 
Nevertheless, there are issues of great importance that 
divide us. Rorty speaks repeatedly of "solidarity," a term 
which, by its nature, applies to the members of a group, and 
on occasions he refers to such groups as "cultures". Another 
phrase he might have used is "language communities," for 
language is part of what binds the members of a culture 
together, makes their discourse possible, and thus provides 
the vehicle for historical change in a group's beliefs. But 
when Rorty discusses beliefs and commitment to them, he 
repeatedly attributes them to an individual: "the 
pragmatist," he proclaims, "says that there is nothing to be 
said about truth save that each of us will commend as true 
those beliefs which he or she finds good to believe" (6). For 
Rorty there is no difference between the beliefs shared by 
the members of a culture -- beliefs which I should describe as 
constitutive of it — and the various different opinions 
accessible to one or another of its members. 
About all this Rorty is explicit: "The same Quinean 
arguments which dispose of the positivists' distinction 
between analytic and synthetic truth dispose of the 
anthropologists' distinction between the inter-cultural and 
the intra-cultural" (10). Or again, "The Tasmanian 
aborigines and the British colonists had trouble 
communicating, but this trouble was different only in extent 
from the difficulties in communication experienced by 
Gladstone and Disraeli" (ibid.). But this application of what 
Rorty calls "Quinean arguments" is, I think, a mistake, and 
his illustration of its conclusion depends on a category 
switch. It is not Gladstone and Disraeli, but the Whigs and 
the Tories, whose communication problems should be 
compared to those of the aborigines and 





colonists. Both pairs can then be seen to involve 
inter-cultural rather than intra-cultural communication, and 
it is the problems of inter-cultural communication which 
Rorty joins Putnam in dismissing. 
The name of those problems is, of course, 
"incommensurability," and I have recently written at length 
about it. Time prevents even an epitome of that paper here, 
but I shall draw two essential points from it. First, both Rorty 
and Putnam are mistaken in thinking that I take 
incommensurability to characterize the relation between 
whole languages. My use of the term has throughout been 
local, restricted to particular sets of interrelated terms, to 
local pockets of language within which translation is 
impossible without drastic distortion and misunderstanding. 
Second, to say that translation is impossible is 
by no means to deny transcultural recourse. One can, with 
whatever difficulty, learn the other language, and then use it 
to talk with the natives, whether aborigines or Tories. Though 
doing that will still not make translation possible, it does 
open the doors to communication. But one cannot pass 
through those doors without becoming, however vicariously, 
a participant in the other culture. There is no lingua franca; 
one must use the language of one culture or the other. The 
alternative is to wait for a pidgin to develop, and that is to 
wait for the evolution of another culture still. 
My point is that language cannot foster group solidarity 
or the evolution of belief through discourse except by 
simultaneously constraining the options open to the 
members of the group it binds. It is ironic that Rorty, who 
wants to keep "Greeks or Frenchmen or Chinese" from being 
homogenized within the concept of 





"objective knowledge of... humanity as such" (3) should 
simultaneously invoke the universality of language, a 
concept with at least the same homogenizing power. And it is 
extraordinary that he should attribute the forces that hold a 
culture together 3imply to "bureaucrats and policemen" 
(10). There are, of course bureaucrats and policemen, often 
in excess. But the first forces that constrain the members of 
a culture are intrinsic to the existence of culture itself. Leave 
aside the anthropological evidence which Rorty simply 
dismisses, but note a strange sentence in his paper: "Only if 
one shares the logical positivists'  idea 
that we all carry around things called 'rules of language' 
which regulate what we say when, will one suggest that there 
is no way to break out of one's culture" (9). Why, if inter- and 
intra-cultural communication are the same, should Rorty 
suppose that talk with foreigners requires breaking out? And 
why, if breaking out is really needed, should he suppose that 
it demands anything less than learning a new language, a 
process that need not, any more than riding a bycycle, be 
governed by rules? 
To see why these disagreements are important, return to 
the area in which Rorty and I agree. There is no standing 
point outside the history of the tribe, and within that history 
inquiry is simply the "continual reweaving of a web of 
beliefs" (9). But there are, of course, numerous tribes, and 
on my view, unlike Rorty's, discourse between them is in 
principle limited. Change and development can therefore 
occur in two distinct ways, either within an individual tribe 
or sub-tribe or else in the multiple relationships between 
them. Look first at intra-tribal development, at the continual 
reweaving which is the most likely 






candidate for the title of progress. Rorty suggests that we 
may think of it "as making it possible for human beings to 
do more interesting things and be more interesting people" 
(12), an evaluation apparently equivalent to the one he 
attributes to me. 
"To say that we think we're heading in the right direction 
is," he writes, "just to say, with Kuhn, that we can, by 
hindsight, tell the story of the past as a story of progress" 
(11). 
With that much I agree, but it does not imply that history 
has no externally recognizable direction. Like biological 
evolution, historical development is a unidirectional 
process, one which admits of no circling back. If a tribe 
developes at all. then there are externally visible ways to 
distinguish its earlier from its later state. One may not 
approve them, and one need not call them progress (not all 
of us are sure that we do do more interesting things or that 
we are more interesting people). But one cannot eliminate 
them or their testimony to the direction of time. 
Transcultural criteria of historical development do not 
vanish with transcultural criteria of truth. The former are 
an essential ingredient of the historical process, and noone 
who takes that process as seriously as Rorty does may 
ignore them. Their role in determining what we 
tribe-members believe is immense. Among them is the 
source of something very like the law of the excluded 
middle. 
One of the clearly marked indices of the passage of tribal 
time is the one Rorty attributes to Feyerabend and urges us 
all to make part of our thinking. We must abandon the view 
of "inquiry, and human activity generally, as converging 
rather than proliferating, as becoming more unified rather 
than more diverse" 
 





(12). I entirely agree. In the life of the mind, at least, no 
phenomenon is more striking than the increase over time in 
the 
number of barely communicating specialties. A diagram 
tracing the proliferation of these sub-tribes would look like 
nothing so much as an evolutionary tree. Where discourse is 
given free reign — a desideratum I value as highly as Rorty -- 
nothing else is to be expected. There is no other process by 
which inquiry can grow, though its consequences make this 
use of the term "growth" problematic. If the same manifest 
tendency to separatism is less successful in the political 
arena, that results from the limited effectiveness of political 
discourse as compared to force majeure. 
Rorty opens his paper by attempting to drive a wedge 
between objectivity and solidarity. At the end of his paper, 
hammering the last nail into the coffin of objectivity, he 
writes: "The best argument we partisans of solidarity have 
against the realistic (sic) partisans of objectivity is 
Nietzsche's argument that the traditional Western 
metaphysico-epistemologlcal way of firming up our habits 
simply isn't working anymore" (20). I agree that it is not. But 
in that foundational sense, solidarity isn't working either. 
The very proliferation and divergence that Rorty and 
Feyerabend invoke to rid us of our gods, of the 
other—worldly concept of objectivity, testify to the decline of 
solidarity as well. That, however, is as it should be, for the 
two are, I think, opposite sides of a single coin. Like 
solidarity, objectivity extends only over the world of the 
tribe, but what it extends over is no less firm and real for 
that. When that reality is threatened, as it sometimes is by 
exposure to other solidary groups, solidarity is necessarily 
threatened as well. Both 





"solidarity" and "objectivity" are, If you will, names for a 
character in a myth. But they name a single character; their 
myth is the one we live; and I can imagine no human life 
without it. 
I said I would speak as Cassandra, and I have been doing 
so. What I fear are attempts to separate language or 
discourse from the real and to do so in the name of 
freedom. I have recounted my fears by speaking of Rorty's 
paper, for it Is there that the attempt at separation Is most 
carefully and fully developed. But the two papers that have 
accompanied his point the same direction, and I shall close 
by indicating how they do so. Both deal explicitly with 
rhetoric, as Rorty's does not, and both presumably 
understand by that term not mere verbal fireworks but 
techniques of effective argument as deployed within the 
various fields of inquiry. On this subject both have much to 
report. But I am troubled that, for all the important things 
they have to say, Professors Hersh and Davis should view 
the ideal structure of mathematical proof as non-rhetor leal 
and locate the rhetoric of mathematics solely at the place or 
places where in practice that ideal fails. For purposes of this 
gathering one might instead explore the idea that 
mathematical proof is itself a piece of rhetorical apparatus, 
a trope. Mathematics might then prove more centrally 
rhetorical than Hersh and Davis are quite prepared to see . 
In fact. I think something of that sort must be the case, 
though I have neither the expertise nor the time to carry the 
argument far. Tropes are rhetorical figures which, by 
substitution, disclose unsuspected consequences of the 
meanings of the terms they deploy. Since Poincare, 
however, it has been 
 






standard to suggest that mathematical proof simply unpacks, 
again by substitution, unsuspected consequences 
tautologically present in the proof’s premises. Can it be simply 
wrong to suggest that tautological substitutions are the 
limiting case, and thus perhaps the purest, of all tropes? 
Could the most coercive of all forms of argument perhaps turn 
out to be rhetoric at its most pristine? Discourse would then 
surely have its tyrannies, and one would not know how to be 
without them. 
Such a conclusion would, I take it, be unwelcome to 
Professors Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey, for they ־־ like 
Professor Rorty but by very different means — are centrally 
concerned to separate talk of truth from talk of discourse and 
to locate tyranny with the former. On their reading (of the 
OED) to convince is to coerce belief, while to persuade is to 
induce it. Rhetoric is concerned 
exclusively with the latter, and they are, of course, for it. Of 
the opposition, they say, “Those who know, know -- because 
they ultimately benefit from a privileged (and often 
undiscussable) intuition or observation that allows certain 
conclusions to follow immediately, by sheer logic. Thus 
conclusions are imposed by authority (supposedly grounded 
in truth) -- often without adequate argument and typically 
without any attention to the contextual and personal details 
that rhetoric recognizes to be crucial for persuasion" (6). 
By now it will surprise none of you to hear that I firmly 
disagree, not about the coercion of belief (which the OED by 
no means equates with convincing) but about rhetoric, logic, 
and authority. Rhetorical consciousness will not banish 
coerciveness from discourse unless discipline and cogency are 
to be banished as 
Thomas Kuhn  10 POROI 10.2 (December 2014) 
 
 
well. That sentence may sugggest the problem this 
morning’s opening paper has presented to me as 
commentator؛ I have been unable to locate in it points of 
entry to discourse or conversation. Conversation requires 
a reasonable consistency to both self and sources. But in 
the paper before me logic is sometimes a tool of 
oppression, elsewhere "constituted as rhetoric" (24). 
Nletsche and Heidegger are rhetoricians when they get 
things right, but Cartesians -- guilty in one case of "his 
tribe’s tendency to pronounce ex cathedra“ (12) — when 
their stance is disapproved. Wittgenstein, whose views on 
the inviolable authority of language were especially strict, 
becomes a figure I can barely recognize. And so on! If this 
paper exemplifies what the new consciousness of rhetoric 
is to produce, then I am more than alarmed. It is not that I 
know my views to be right, theirs wrong, but that their use 
of language and text bars the paths of discourse along 
which we might otherwise together have moved ahead. 
